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PUBLIC ACCESS TO NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY BEACHES:
HAS EITER STATE ADEQUATELY FULFILLED ITS
RESPONSIBILITIES AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this Note concerns the following two issues: 1) whether
the Public Trust Doctrine is fully recognized by the courts of New York
and New Jersey, and if so 2) whether the courts of both states have been
effective or ineffective in utilizing their powers as trustee under the
Doctrine to protect and preserve public access to beachfront property.
The thesis for this Note is based on the historical function of the
Doctrine, which is to prevent the dissipation of public lands through
negligent or improper conversion to private uses.' Three principles are
central to this Doctrine. First, that certain properties, namely the seas,
seashores, and navigable waterways, are owned in common by the public
and subject to public rights of ingress and egress. 2 Second, that the form
of such ownership has been established as a trust between the state and
its citizens.3 Third, that implicit in the state's fiduciary role as trustee is a
presumption that public lands not be disposed of in a manner that sub-
stantially impairs the interests of the public.4
Under trustee law, the trustee has a duty to the beneficiary of the
trust to exercise such care and skill as a person of ordinary prudence
would exercise in dealing with his or her own property.5 The trustee rep-
resenting the estate must take possession of and protect the property of
the estate; preserve, and where prudent, enhance the value of the prop-
erty; and defend its legal rights and interests.6 The fact that the trust is a
1. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effec-
tive Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471,484 (1970).
2. See, e.g., 2 THE INSTnTuTES OF JuSTnaAN, 65 (J. Thomas trans. 1975); H.
BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S. Thorne trans. 1968); Illi-
nois Cent. RR. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452-53 (1892).
3. See sources cited supra note 2.
4. See sources cited supra note 2.
5. See Thomas A. Campbell, The Public Trust, What's it Worth?, 34 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 73, 76 (1994).
6. See id.
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public one does not allow the government as trustee to remain passive.'
To the contrary, the government as trustee must protect trust property
against loss, dissipation, or diminution and conduct itself with diligence,
fairness, and faithfulness. 8 The recognized public uses for trust property
include commerce, navigation, fishing, recreation, and preservation of
such property in its natural state.9
Whether New York and New Jersey have fulfilled their obligations
as trustees is brought into sharp focus when examined in the context of
beachfront property and its accessibility by the public. It is in this idyllic
beachfront setting, among our most treasured natural resources, that a
titanic struggle between opposing forces is taking place. 10 It is not the
age old struggle between surf and sand but the increasingly frequent and
intense collision between two treasured sets of expectancy interests:
those of private landowners who expect their titles to land and water to
remain secure, and those of the general public, who expFects that most of
its beaches will remain beaches and open to its access.' This conflict has
been exacerbated by a change in public values towards our most precious
water resources. 2 The use of these resources has now reached critical
limits.
13
The phenomenal growth in coastal area population threatens to con-
tinue unabated. 14 Sixty-five (65) percent of the population of the United
States lives less than fifty miles from the coast and this already amaz-
ingly high percentage is expected to increase to seventy-five (75) percent
by the year 2000.15 The increasing frequency of conflict between the two
sets of expectancy interests is directly related to this surge in population
7. See id. at 77.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See discussion infra pp. 2-3.
11. See James M. Kehoe, The Next Wave In Public Beach Access: Removal of
States as Trustees of The Public Trust Properties, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1913, 1914
(1995).
12. See Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L.
473,474 (1989).
13. See id.
14. See Daniel Summerlin, Improving Public Access to Coastal Beaches: The Ef-
fect of Statutory Management and The Public Trust Doctrine, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REV. 425 (1996).
15. See Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1913 n.2.
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growth.16 As the coastal population increases, so does the desire to own
land on or near the coast. 17 As private ownership of coastal land in-
creases, the availability of coastal land for use by the public decreases,
setting the stage for increased conflict.
1 8
As we will soon discover, New York's decisional law concerning
beachfront property evidences a reluctance and, in instances related to
private property, an aversion to recognizing and applying fully the termi-
nology and principles of the Public Trust Doctrine. 19 Similarly, New Jer-
sey, despite its self proclaimed activist role in support of the Doctrine
and apparent facility to articulate the terminology of the Doctrine, has
failed to recognize or apply fully the Doctrine's principles. 0
At this point, it is appropriate to look at the itinerary for our voyage.
Part II starts with Section A, the background and development of the
Public Trust Doctrine, beginning from ancient history, continuing
through semi-ancient history, and concluding with current history. Our
journey continues with Section B, which presents a brief evaluation of
the weaknesses and strengths of the Doctrine, and Section C, an equally
brief presentation of apparent alternatives to the Doctrine. Section D
brings us close to the end of this leg of our voyage by presenting a de-
scription of the conflict between private property and public use expec-
tancy interests. Section E concludes Part II, and prepares us for our voy-
age into deeper water by suggesting a framework for analysis of New
York and New Jersey's Public Trust Doctrine jurisprudence.
Parts Il and IV take us on the longest, but by no means most tranquil
part of our voyage by presenting a careful examination of New York and
New Jersey's jurisprudence in applying the Doctrine to access and use of
beachfront property. Part V returns us to shore with a conclusion on
whether, and to what degree New York and New Jersey's decisional law
recognizes the Public Trust Doctrine. In the end, Part VI, despite identi-
fying potential suggestions for improvement, leaves us lying on the
beach uncomfortably close to the incoming tide, unsure of how much
longer we will be allowed to stay, or whether even the beach itself will
be allowed to remain.
16. See Summerlin, supra note 14, at 425.
17. See id.
18. See Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1913.
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
20001
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H. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRhNE
A. Background and Development
1. Ancient History
The Public Trust Doctrine was first expressed in the work of Justin-
ian in his compendium of principles of Roman law,21 which provided
that "by the law of nature these things are common to mankind - the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea."22 The air,
water, sea, and shore were considered res communes23 or "common to
all," and were not subject to private ownership.24 An almost identical
view was eventually reflected in the customs of most countries through-
out Europe in the Middle Ages.
2. Semi-ancient History
Eventually, the Public Trust Doctrine appeared in the English com-
mon law through the writings of Bracton.26 Under English common law,
public trust or sovereignty lands were not simply res communes.27 Title,
jus privatum,28 was held by the King, while dominion over the lands, jus
publicum,29 was vested in the crown as a trust for the benefit of the pub-
lic.30 Jus Privatum is the lesser title and concerns the right of the sover-
eign to alienate trust lands subject to the rights of the public under thejus
21. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-
635 (1986).
22. THE INSTruTS OF JusNIAN bk. 2, 65 (J. Thomas trans. 1975).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 635.
26. See H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S. Thome
trans. 1968).
27. See DONNA R. CHRISTIE, COASTAL AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT LAW, 18-19
(1994).
28. See BRACTON, supra note 26.
29. See id.
30. See CHRIsTIE, supra note 27, at 19.
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publicum.31 Thejuspublicum is the dominant title and concerns the right
of the public to access and use the trust lands for navigation, commerce,
and fishing.32
3. Current History
Later, the Public Trust Doctrine was adopted in the United States as
part of the English common law.33 The Doctrine is nearly universally
accepted throughout the United States.34 However, the dual sovereign
nature of the United States federal system required that the interests pro-
vided under the Doctrine be defined differently for the federal govern-
ment versus state governments. 35 The federal government's interest fo-
cuses on the commerce in interstate navigable waters and is labeled the
"federal navigation servitude." 36 The state governments' interest focuses
on the bed of navigable waters within each state's border and is labeled
"sovereign ownership. 37 The federal government's version of the Public
Trust Doctrine was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1824 in
Gibbons v. Ogden,38 and then repeated in a host of succeeding judicial
decisions concerning the scope and magnitude of this federal navigation
servitude. 39 In contrast, the state's Public Trust Doctrine, developed dif-
ferently within each state, suggested that each state had special powers
over certain water resources and owed certain duties to the public with
respect to these water resources.
a
4
In the 1892 landmark public trust case of Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois,41 the Supreme Court ruled that "lands were held by the state, as
they were by the King, in trust for public uses....',42 The Court was
clear and unambiguous in declaring that the public trust obligations im-
31. See Summerlin, supra note 14, at 428-29.
32. See id. at 429.
33. See CHRISTiE, supra note 27, at 19.
34. See Summerlin, supra note 14, at 425.
35. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 636.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
39. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 637.
40. See id.
41. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
42. Id. at 457.
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posed upon the states could not be abandoned by attempting to convey
trust properties.43
The concept that the Doctrine was akin to a trust, with the sovereign
as trustee, arose from this notion of sovereign ownership and duties owed
to the public.44 Through later judicial decisions, this evolved into a prin-
ciple that declared sovereign-owned lands to be inalienable. 45 Modem
jurisprudence has loosened the Doctrine from its traditional moorings of
navigation, commerce, and fishing.46 In addition to these traditional uses
have been added contemporary interests including tidelands, navigable
waterways other than oceans, and recreational uses. 7 Environmental and
ecological protection and preservation are also considered to be within
the trust.48 Basically, the Doctrine states that shorelands, bottomlands,
tidelands, tidewaters, navigable freshwater, and the plant and animal life
living on or in these waters are owned by the public but held in trust by
the state for the benefit of the public.49 The Doctrine provides the public
with lateral access over these lands, such access being limited to that area
of the beach below the historical high water mark.50 However, the his-
torical Doctrine does not provide for perpendicular access across land to
the beachfront.51 In view of the increasing privatization of the coastline,
this missing right has resulted in the absurd situation of beaches open to
the public but with no way for the public to reach them.52 This Note will
argue that New York and New Jersey's jurisprudence has failed to de-
velop a solution to this dilemma.
43. See id. at 453.
44. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 637.
45. See id.
46. See Sunmerlin, supra note 14, at 426.
47. See id.
48. See Sax, supra note 12, at 473-74.
49. See Summerlin, supra note 14, at 426.
50. See id. at 425-26.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 426-27.
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B. Weaknesses and Strengths of the Public Trust Doctrine
1. Weaknesses
There is little uniformity to the Public Trust Doctrine. 3 Each state
has its own version and interpretation based on its views of justice and
policy.54 Some states have interpreted and applied the Doctrine expan-
sively while others have done so narrowly.55 Interpretation and applica-
tion of the Doctrine vacillates between an expansive interpretation and
application that favors the public welfare to a narrow interpretation and
56application that favors private interests. For the most part, the Doctrine
remains limited in application to the traditional trust purposes of naviga-
tion, commerce, and fishing and traditional trust lands 7 including navi-
gable waters, submerged lands, and that part of the shoreline between the
high and low watermarks known as the foreshore.5 ' This has resulted in
inconsistent and confusing rulings and threatens to reduce the Doctrine to
an inefficient rule-making system.
5 9
2. Strengths
Despite the lack of uniformity throughout the United States, each
state's version of the Doctrine is based upon a few central principles.60
The Doctrine provides that there are two titles vested in public trust
lands.61 The dominant title is known as thejus publicum and provides the
53. See id. at 428.
54. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-32 (1893).
55. See Summerlin, supra note 14, at 426.
56. The variability in judicial interpretation and application of the Public trust
Doctrine is examined in greater detail in Parts Ill and IV of the Note.
57. The limited application of the Public Trust Doctrine to traditional purposes and
lands is reflected in New York and New Jersey's jurisprudence as presented in Parts HI
and IV of the Note.
58. There are at least four terms of art used to distinguish beachfront land: Under-
water Land is that land seaward of the low tide mark; Foreshore is that land located be-
tween the low and high water marks; Dry Sand Area is that land located between the high
water mark and the vegetation line; Upland is that area landward of the vegetation line.
See Summerlin, supra note 14, at 426 n. 6.
59. See id. at 430.
60. See id. at 428.
61. See id.
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public with the right to access and use trust property for navigation,
commerce, fishing, and other purposes. 62 The lesser title is known as the
jus privatum and provides the state with the Fower to develop and sell
trust lands subject to thejuspublicum interest.
Another strength of the Doctrine is that it is a property right specifi-
cally aimed at waterfront and coastal issues, not a police power of the
stater a This allows the Doctrine to be employed to address the exigen-
cies of the coastline and create protective environmental programs.
65
Such action is unavailable under the police power, which in addition to
not being tailored to address the specific problems of coastal areas, has
traditionally been aimed at restricting harmful activities.66 Governmental
use of the police power is also more likely to violate the Takings
Clause67 than use of the Public Trust Doctrine. This is because the Doc-
trine is grounded in property and trust law. 68 Accordingly, the govern-
ment is protected from claims of taking without due process of law as
long as the government, in its capacity as trustee, has acted within its
rights and has not breached its duty to the beneficiary, the public.69
Yet another strength of the Doctrine is that it is based on well estab-
lished and defined trust law. 70 The trustee, beneficiaries, and purpose of
the trust are clear and definite, and the Doctrine is flexible enough to ad-
dress nearly all issues that arise with respect to the coast.71 Thus, it is not
necessary to continuously legislate to meet changing conditions.72
62. See id. at 428-29.




67. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Summerlin, supra note 14, at 429 n.34.
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C. Alternatives to the Public Trust Doctrine
In an attempt to shore-up their approach to dealing with the in-
creasing coastal crisis, states have tried to utilize various alternatives to
the Public Trust Doctrine.73
1. Public Easements by Prescription
In order to acquire a prescriptive easement, possession must be con-
tinuous, uninterrupted, exclusive use that is open and notorious and ad-
verse under claim of right.74 Most states recognize that continual use of a
beach by the public constitutes a prescriptive easement.7s However, the
notion that a prescriptive easement could be acquired by the diverse
public, based on seasonal use of the beach that is adverse to the land-
owners, is at best problematic for exactly these reasons.76 It is unlikely
that all of the of required conditions will be met by so diverse a group as
the public."
2. Implied Dedication
Dedication of property to public use, unlike a prescriptive easement,
does not necessarily require a specific time period.78 However, it does
depend on intent and can be as problematic as a prescriptive easement.79
If the implied dedication is by owner acquiescence, it is the owner's in-
tent that matters, not the length of public use.8° If the implied dedication
73. See Luise Welby, Public Access to Private Beaches: A Tidal Necessity, 6
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLICY 69, 74 (1986).
74. See CHRISTIE, supra note 27, at 40.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Establishing a prescriptive easement by public use is conceptually problematic
because it can be argued that seasonal use by diverse members of the public can never
meet the requirements of continuous or exclusive use. Furthermore, private waterfront
property owners have also maintained that because it is impossible to bring an action for
ejectment or trespass against the general public, the public should not be able to gain
rights through prescription. See id.





is by adverse use, it is the adverse user's intent that matters.81 To further
muddy the waters, the specific time period of use required to ripen into
dedication is not uniformly established.82 This lack of uniformity also
distinguishes implied dedication from a prescriptive easement.83 Once
again, it is unlikely that the required conditions will be met by so diverse
a group as the public.
3. Customary Use
Some states have found that a public easement exists to use the
beach based on customary use.84 This doctrine holds that the public may
not be excluded from private property that it has customarily used in an
uninterrupted fashion from ancient times.85 However, the application of
this doctrine is either too broad or too narrow because of the require-
ments necessary to establish customary use. The requirements of custom
for public use are: public use that is ancient, exercised without interrup-
tion, reasonable, peaceable, obligatory, and not repugnant to custom or
law.86 However, as with prescriptive easements and implied dedication, it
is unlikely that all of the required conditions will be met by so diverse a
group as the public.
4. Eminent Domain
Acquiring access for the public to beachfront property through emi-
nent domain is the alternative most favored by private property owners.87
However, it is the most expensive method of acquiring public access to
the beachfront because such property is so costly.
8
81. Seeid.
82. See id. at44.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 45; see also Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal.3d 29 (1970).
85. See id. CRIsIE, supra note 27, at 45.
86. See id. at 44 (referring to Blackstone's Commentaries).




D. The Inevitable Conflict Between Private Property Rights and the
Public Trust Doctrine
Coastal beaches are a unique and extremely valuable resource. 89 Un-
fortunately, the fixed supply of coastline and an ever increasing popula-
tion have created a situation in which many Americans are finding di-
minishing opportunities to access the beachfront.90 The tension is only
increased by the continued privatization of available waterfront prop-
erty.91 When beachfront landowners, through continued waterfront de-
velopment, can prevent the public from gaining access to the ocean, the
ocean itself is effectively converted into private property.92 This tension
has brought into acute focus the issue of public access to the beach ver-
sus privately owned beachfront property.
9
The management of beachfront property is polarized by two diamet-
rically opposed views. 94 On one hand are the general public who favor
greater public access to the beach.95 They advocate a general public right
of access to and use of every beach in the country without regard to
whether the beachfront property is privately or publicly owned.96 On the
other hand are the private owners of beachfront property.97 They advo-
cate that general public access to beachfront should be limited only to
public beaches. 98 These are not merely opposing opinions or views but
competing expectancy interests.99 Hence, conflict over them is inevitable.
However, both of these views are seriously flawed.100
On one hand, if the public were to succeed in gaining access to all
beaches from every point along the beachfront, such success would come
at the expense of violating the Constitutional rights of private property
89. See Welby, supra note 76, at 70.
90. See Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1913.
91. See Summerlin, supra note 14, at 425.
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owners. 101 Even though the Doctrine forbids the alienation of such trust
lands in a manner that substantially impairs the interests of the public,
the reality is that such conveyances have taken place. 10 2 If the govern-
ment sponsored unlimited public access, private property owners would
be deprived of their rights without due process of law. 03 Such govern-
ment sponsored deprivations of private property rights without compen-
sation would constitute a taldng.'04
On the other hand, restricting public use of the beachfront to the cur-
rent access points and public beaches, especially in view of the near tidal
wave increase in the numbers of people flocking to the beach, threatens
to deny many the enjoyment that they are entitled to under the Doctrine
and increase litigation related to this conflict in expectancy interests.
0 5
E. Framework for Analysis of New York and New Jersey's Public Trust
Doctrine Jurisprudence.
The professed purpose of this Note is to evaluate whether New York
and New Jersey, through their respective judicial decisions, have ade-
quately fulfilled their responsibilities as trustees under the Public Trust
Doctrine. To this end, it is important to articulate from all of the fore-
going the principles that are embodied in the Doctrine:
1. The first principle, public accessibility to trust lands, holds that
certain properties, namely the seas, seashores, and navigable
waterways are owned in common by the public and thus, subject
to public rights of ingress and egress.1
0 6
2. The second principle, the public trust, holds that the form of
such common ownership has been established as a trust between
the state and its citizens.
10 7
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1914.
102. See discussion infra pp. 201-203,208-210, 215-216.
103. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1914.
104. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1914.
105. See id. at 1915.
106. See supra note 2.
107. See supra note 2.
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3. The third principle, the inalienability of trust lands, establishes a
presumption that the state, in its fiduciary role as trustee, not dis-
pose of public lands in a manner that substantially impairs the
interests of the public.108
The foregoing framework will be superimposed on the judicial deci-
sions of New York and New Jersey to determine whether they have rec-
ognized and relied upon the Doctrine's principles to make such deci-
sions.
I. NEW YORK'S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Foundational Cases
This section will examine the early New York jurisprudence on in-
terpretation and application of the Public Trust Doctrine as evidenced by
a number of cases decided in the mid-to-late 1800's.109 In these cases, the
issues related to ownership of the shorefront, the land under the shore,
and fishing were primarily examined in the context of riparian rights or
equitable estoppel rather than the Public Trust Doctrine. 10 The court ap-
peared to avoid deciding these cases by express application of the Public
Trust Doctrine."
However, a close look at the wording of the decision in Trustees of
Brookhaven v. Strong,' 2 decided in 1875, reveals that the court partially
recognized the primary principles of the Doctrine but ultimately elected
to characterize them as "confused and antiquated customs, obsolete terms
and distinctions, and conflicting opinions."'" 3 In Strong, the court appar-
ently based its decision to allow the alienation of land under the sea for
the purposes of oyster fishing on the principle of prescription." 4 How-
ever, the court also held that title to the lands under the water of bays and
108. See supra note 2.
109. See, e.g., Trustees of Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. 56, 66-67 (1875); see
also Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 23 N.E. 1002 (N.Y. 1890).
110. See id.
11. Seeid.
112. 60 N.Y. 56 (1875).
113. Id. at 66; see also discussion infra pp. 196-197.
114. See id. at 66-67.
2000]
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harbors was "subject to the superior public right to use them for all navi-
gable purposes .... The foregoing would appear to be an extremely
narrow recognition of the first principle of the Public Trust Doctrine,
namely that certain lands are owned in common by the public and subject
to public rights of ingress and egress. 116 However, the court clearly did
not recognize the second principle of the Doctrine as no mention was
made that state control of the land under navigable waters takes the form
of a trust, with the state as trustee for the public.'17 As a result of the
court's recognition that land under navigable waters was subject to the
public right of navigation, the court impliedly recognized that such land
could not be alienated if to do so would materially prejudice the common
right.118 Yet, this part of the court's holding does not fully recognize the
third principle of the Doctrine. 19 This principle establishes that the trus-
tee may not dispose of public lands in a manner that substantially impairs
the interests of the public. 20 The New York court apparently had no res-
ervations with respect to alienation of trust lands as long as the munici-
pality received compensation for such transfers.' 2' Justifying alienation
of trust land as not materially prejudicing the common right so long as
consideration is received ignores the fact that beachfront is limited in
supply, unique in character, and not replicable. 122 Such alienation directly
conflicts with the intent of the Doctrine because the common right will
always be materially prejudiced when invaluable and irreplaceable land
is exchanged for mere monetary compensation.
23
In Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 124 decided in 1890, the New
York court appeared to steer even further away from reliance on the
Public Trust Doctrine as the court neither expressly applied the Doctrine
nor anchored its decision in the Doctrine's principles. 25 In deciding an
issue akin to determining the validity of title to trust land, the court found
115. Id. at67.
116. See id. at 67; see also discussion infra pp. 200-20 1.
117. See id. at 63-73 (1875).
118. See id.
119. See discussion infra pp. 200-201.
120. See Trustees of Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. at 63-73.
121. See id. 66-67.
122. See Welby, supra note 76, at 70.
123. See discussion infra pp. 185-187.
124. 23 N.E. 1002 (N.Y. 1890).
125. See id. at 1003.
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no imrediment to a municipality's alienating trust land to private owner-
ship.1 6 To the contrary, the court defended the private title held in undis-
puted possession for nearly 200 years against the municipality's attempt
to assert ownership.12 7 The court based its decision on a theory of equita-
ble estoppel.
28
It was not until the 1920's that the New York court appeared to fi-
nally recognize that the Public Trust Doctrine should be considered in
issues pertaining to ownership of the foreshore and land under tidal wa-
ters.'29 In Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay,130 the court addressed the issue
of ownership rights of upland shore created by the filling in of the fore-
shore by a riparian owner.131 In so doing, the court held that the answer
required a consideration "(a) of the jus publicum, (b) the jus privatum,
and (c) the right of ownership of the adjacent upland.' ' 32 The court held
that the law on the subject was not well defined and admitted that prior
cases on similar issues had been decided based on "safe generalities."
133
However, the court declined the opportunity to be much more coura-
geous than its predecessors and stopped short of delineating the major
principles of the Doctrine. Instead, the court limited itself to an express
recognition of the existence of the Doctrine, with a simultaneously broad
and narrow interpretation of the right of public access. 134 The court held
that the jus publicum included "the right of navigation, and when the tide
is out, the right of access to the water for fishing, bathing and other law-
ful purposes to which the right of passage over the beach may be a nec-
essary incident."'' s The court's recognition is broad in the respect that it
included the right of access across the foreshore for bathing and other
lawful purposes, and narrow in the respect that such a right to pass on
126. See id. at 1003.
127. See id. at 1004.
128. The general rule for equitable estoppel is that if one is induced to purchase
land based on the acts or representations of another designed to influence his conduct,
and which create a reasonable belief on his part under which he acts in the belief that he
is acquiring good title, the party who has thus influenced the purchaser is estopped from
setting up his own title against that of the purchaser. See id. at 1003.
129. See Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 136 N.E. 224,225 (N.Y. 1922).
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adjoining land was limited to the exposed land up to the high water mark
and when the tide was out.
1 36
The principle of the Doctrine directly implicated in Tiffany, that trust
property cannot be alienated, was apparently neither recognized nor ap-
plied by the court.137 Instead, the court arrived at a holding that preserved
the status quo between private and public rights that preexisted the filling
in of the foreshore. With respect to the inalienability of trust property,
the court would go only as far as to state: "Doubtless, the town has large
beneficial rights and privileges therein, but we should not undertake by
premature assertion to decide their nature and extent in detail., 138 In ex-
pressing so crabbed an interpretation, the court was content to leave fur-
ther development of the Doctrine to another time and place.
B. Decisions Since 1970
In 1971, in Dolphin Lane Associates v. Town of Southampton,139 pri-
vate property interests clashed with zoning ordinances enacted by a mu-
nicipality favoring public access and use of waterfront property.140 The
court relied on the law of easements to insure public access to the water-
front.1 41 However, the court also relied on the Public Trust Doctrine prin-
ciple pertaining to alienation of trust lands to determine ownership of the
land below the average high water line.
142
In what had by now become common practice, 143 the New York Su-
preme Court, in Dolphin Lane Associates, once again avoided implicat-
ing the Public Trust Doctrine by name, preferring to describe it as a sub-
ject that has "been a prolific source of judicial discussion from the earli-
est times, and, judging from the numerous recent decisions, the subject is
still as fresh as ever."'" The court's inability to state the Doctrine's
proper name was not its only oversight. 145 The court seemingly did not
136. See id.
137. See id. at 226.
138. Id.
139. 339 N.Y.S. 2d966 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
140. See id. at 968.
141. See id. at 978.
142. See id. at 982, 985.
143. See, e.g., Strong, 60 N.Y. 56, Smith, 23 N.E. 1002, Tiffany, 136 N.E. 224.
144. Dolphin LaneAssoc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 966, 981.
145. See id. at 978.
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perceive the Doctrine as being applicable to the issue of public access to
the waterfront and relied entirely on the fact that the conveyances in
question expressly provided for an easement in favor of the public. 146 In
what amounted to the narrowest recognition imaginable short of com-
pletely gutting the Doctrine, the court managed to find the Doctrine ap-
plicable to the issue of alienation of lands under water. 147 The court held
that the issue of the ownership of such lands had long been settled as re-
maining in the sovereign for the benefit of the public.148 Furthermore, the
court held that a grant of title to land below the shoreline would clearly
be invalid and illegal.149 The holding also made absolutely clear that such
limitations on a municipality's power to convey land fronting on naviga-
ble waters applied only to that land below the high water line.150
In Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach,'5' a decision reminiscent of its
holding in Dolphin Lane,152 the New York Supreme Court addressed the
issue of a municipality's attempt to restrict use of a public park and
beach. 53 The park and beach had been open to the public for thirty-four
years before the municipality amended its code to limit access to resi-
dents only. 54 If ever there was a case that presented an issue based on
facts that cried out for resolution based on the Public Trust Doctrine, this
was it. Instead, the court elected to examine the issue based on "whether
there has been a dedication by the city which precludes it from taking
action limiting the use of the beach to residents•...5 and in so doing,
render a holding that can only be characterized as injurious to the Public
Trust Doctrine. After meandering through the backwaters of the law of
dedication,156 the court declared that the municipality, by dedicating the
property to use as a public park and beach by the "public at large for up-
wards of thirty years, put itself in a position of having to hold that prop-
146. See id.
147. See id. at 982.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 981.
151. 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
152. 339 N.Y.S.2d 966.
153. See id. at 500.
154. See id. at 500.
155. Id. at 504.
156. See id. at 504-08.
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erty subject to a public trust for the benefit of the public at large."157
Adding insult to injury, the court further enunciated that allowing the
municipality to exclude the public access to a park and beach held in
trust for the public would achieve a result "that violates the public trust
principle since as to those who are excluded ... [the] policy is as much a
diversion of use as ... if the municipality changed the use of the park or
sold it.'
158
It is not until Tucci v. Salzhauer,159 where the plaintiff made a claim
under the "doctrine of jus publicum,"'160 that the court acknowledged the
existence of the Public Trust Doctrine and applied one of the Doctrine's
underlying principles to the issue in question.161 In Tucci, the court was
faced with the now familiar and still inevitable conflict between public
and private ownership rights.' 62 The plaintiff, a member of the beach-
going public, sought to clear a path across waterfront property owned by
a private party who opposed both the clearing and public access.163 While
the court addressed the issue of clearing and maintaining a pathway by
holding that an easement existed,' 64 it apparently relied solely on the
Public Trust Doctrine, in name and principle, to address the issue of
public access across privately owned property.1 65 With respect to the
rights of the public in the foreshore, the court held "that the Tiffany deci-
sion definitively established as the law of this state that the right of the
public to use the foreshore when the tide is out, is limited to the right
merely to pass over it as a means of access to the water .. ,,166 The ap-
pellate court167 slightly expanded the law of the state with respect to
public use of the foreshore by holding that "when the tide is out, he may
pass and repass over the foreshore as a means of access to reach the wa-
ter for the same purposes and to lounge and recline thereon .... ss168
157. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 512.
159. 329 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
160. Id. at 827.
161. See id. at 833-34.
162. See id. at 827.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 828-32.
165. See id. at 232.
166. Id. at 833.
167. See Tucci, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721.
168. Id. at713.
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However, the question remains whether the court in Tucci would have
been so strong an advocate of the Public Trust Doctrine to support access
across privately held waterfront property if a prior recorded easement,
providing a right of way to the foreshore, had not existed. 69 Such advo-
cacy becomes especially suspect in view of the court's minimal recogni-
tion and application of the Doctrine in past cases. 170 Furthermore, the
court's interpretation of the public access principle of the Doctrine is ex-
tremely narrow. 171 Public access across land is limited to when the tide is
out. When the tide is in, no accommodation is made to allow use of up-
land sand.' 72 Finally, the court completely ignored the doctrinal principle
pertaining to the inalienability of trust lands.173 This principle bears di-
rectly on the issue of validity of title to such lands, 174 which in turn has a
direct bearing on the need to rely on an easement to justify public ac-
cess.
175
Finally, in Gladsky v. Glen Cove,176 the court confronted the issue of
whether trust lands, specifically waterfront property, could be alien-
ated. 177 The defendant municipality, apparently unaware of either the
state's General City Law178 or the Public Trust Doctrine, solicited offers
for the sale of certain waterfront property.179 The plaintiff-buyer's offer
was accepted by the municipality, which subsequently learned that it was
prohibited from conveying the property. 1s The plaintiff brought suit to
compel specific performance by the municipality. 181 The court held the
"resolution of the controversy turns on General City Law §20 (2),"182
which statutorily restricted the municipality's power to convey such
169. See Tucci, 329 N.Y.S. 2d at 830.
170. See, e.g., Dolphin Lane Assoc., 339 N.Y.S. 2d 966, Gewirtz, 330 N.Y.S.2d
495.
171. See Tucci, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721.
172. See id. at 723.
173. See discussion infra pp. 200-201 and note 2.
174. See discussion infra pp. 200-201 and note 2.
175. See Tucci, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
176. 563 N.Y.S.2d 842 (App. Div. 1991).
177. See id. at 843.
178. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §20 (2) (McKinney 1990).
179. See Gladsky, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
180. See id. at 843-44.
181. Seeid.
182. Id. at 844
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property by pioviding that "the rights to a city in and to its waterfront
... land under water... are hereby declared to be inalienable."'
8 3
However, in Gladsky, the result really turned on the Public Trust
Doctrine,184 which formed the basis for the New York Legislature's en-
acting the statutory restriction in the first place. 8 5 The court there states:
"the Legislature, cognizant of the well-settled common-law rule that a
'public trust' is impressed upon certain forms of publicly held prop-
erty' 86 enacted the statutory restriction on alienation of trust land. 87 In
view of this statement that the Public Trust Doctrine is settled common
law, how is it that the court has continually avoided the issue of ascer-
taining the validity of title from past conveyances of trust land? 8 Did
the court suddenly realize that the common law is well-settled or was it
just too easy to apply the inalienability of trust land principle to this fact
pattern? After all, in doing so, private property owners' settled interests
weren't upset because the waterfront property in question was in the mu-
nicipality's possession from the beginning.189 Would this result have
been different if the waterfront property was acquired by a private party
prior to the New York Legislature's enactment, and a group of public
citizens brought suit to have the title declared invalid based on the Doc-
trine's inalienability prong? With the tide of litigation rising, 190 it's only
a matter of time before we find out how the court will rule on this issue.
IV. NEW JERSEY'S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Foundational Cases
The case of Arnold v. Mundy'9' is generally regarded as the first case






188. See, e.g., Strong, 60 N.Y. 56, Tucci, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495.
189. See Gladsky, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
190. See Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1915.
191. 6N.J.L. 1 (1821).
192. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 637 n28.
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New Jersey court stated that "where the tide ebbs and flows, the ports,
the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both water and the land under
the water .. are common to all people, and that each has a right to use
them according to his pleasure .... It is in this 1821 case the court
first mapped out the battle lines between the conflicting expectancy in-
terests of private and public property ownership. 194 The court was keenly
aware that it was treading on hallowed ground and that any decision that
it might render in favor of one set of expectancy interests would come at
the expense of the other.195 In being forced to render a decision, the court
lamented that doing so "might prove exceedingly injurious"'196 to one or
both of these competing interests, and perhaps result in a "conflict for
superiority' ' 197 that would "not only to disturb the peace of society but
also ... destroy the very subject matter of controversy."' 198
B. Decisions Since 1970
After a long period during which the strength of the Doctrine's pro-
tection of common rights was slowly eroded by decisional law that ac-
ceded those rights to legislative purpose and private property interests,
the tide began to change. 199 The New Jersey court charted a new course,
hoisted its main-sail, and got underway in terms of restoring the promise
of the Doctrine as enunciated in Arnold v. Mundy.200
In New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane,20 1 the
court began to reverse the tide of decisions eroding the vitality of the
Doctrine and in the process, loosened the Doctrine from its traditional
moorings of being primarily applicable to fishing and navigation.202 In
this case, the court faced the issue of whether the legislature could alien-
193. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 12.





199. See Leonard J. Jaffe, The Public Trust Doctrine Is Alive And Kicking In New
Jersey Tidalwaters: Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea - A Case Of Happy Atavism?, 14
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 309 (1971).
200. 6N.J.L. 1(1821).
201. 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972).
202. See id. at 552.
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ate trust lands to private parties for the construction of a sports complex
for recreation and health, including bathing, boating and associated ac-
tivities.20 3 The majority opinion proclaimed that the operation and main-
tenance of a sports and exposition complex was a public project that
served a public purpose.2° The majority, in recognition of the Doctrine
and its principle of inalienability of trust land, 20 5 held that the state's
grant of permission to build the sports complex on tideflowed land did
not violate the Doctrine.0 6 The basis for this part of the court's holding
was the fact that the state made no sale or transfer of title to the trust land
in question.20 7
While the majority opinion in New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Authority signaled a renewed recognition of the Doctrine,208 it is the dis-
senting opinion that admitted the New Jersey Court's failure to adhere to
the Doctrine in previous cases and proclaimed it time to revitalize and
resurrect the Doctrine to preserve increasingly scarce water resources.0 9
The dissent stated that it was
"high time that the doctrine be reinvigorated and enforced to its
full intent and purpose in the light of modem conditions, even
though we may not be able to undo prior transgressions of it.
Remaining tidal water resources.. .are becoming very
scarce... demands upon them... much heavier, and their im-
portance to the public welfare... much more apparent. We
should safeguard the common right and interest in what is left."
210
Yet, it is ironic that, at a time when the remaining tidal water re-
sources still in the ownership of the state had become increasingly
scarce, 2 11 the Doctrine resurfaced in a factual setting where it was used to
203. See id.
204. See id.




209. See id. at 573, 579 (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. See id. at 579.
211. See id.
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justify the alienation of public trust lands for purposes deemed to be in
the best interests of the public.
212
In the wake of the New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. decision,
the New Jersey court decided Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of
Avon-By-The-Sea.213 In Avon, the court addressed the question of
whether an oceanfront community could charge non-residents higher fees
than residents for use of the beach area.214 In so doing, the court declined
to decide the issue based upon a theory of discrimination.215 Instead, the
court elected to approach the case from a more fundamental viewpoint
based upon an expanded application of the Public Trust Doctrine to in-
clude dry upland beach.216 Clearly, inclusion of the dry upland beach as
part of trust lands represented an expansion of the Doctrine's traditional
coverage from "where the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the
coasts of the sea, including both water and the land under the water
.... ,,217 Expansion of the Doctrine's traditional scope to include dry up-
land shore allowed the court to address the issue of higher beach access
fees for non-residents than for residents under the Doctrine's principle of
public access to trust lands.218 However, in deciding that the Doctrine's
principle of public access to trust lands dictated that any state or munici-
pal action that impaired equal access on equal terms is impermissible, 
2 9
the court took advantage of this opportunity to speak about the Doc-
trine's other principle pertaining to improper alienation of trust lands and
the consequences of such action to public accessibility to the beach-
front.220 The court stated in no uncertain terms that "control of the state
for purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as
are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be dis-
posed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining.
' 221
212. See id. at 560.
213. 294 A.2d47 (N.J. 1972).
214. See id. at 48.
215. See id. at 51.
216. See id.
217. See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 12.
218. See Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 48.
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In essence, the court's holding in Avon 222 salvaged from the depths,
the public trust Doctrine's principle of inalienability of trust lands.223 The
holding signaled a 180 degree turn away from the broad statements made
in the cases decided in the intervening years between Arnold224 and Avon,
where it was repeatedly held that the legislature had an unlimited power
to convey trust lands to private parties.225
Of even greater significance is that, the court in Avon appears to have
answered the question left unasked and unanswered by the court in Ex-
position Authority.226 In Exposition Authority, the court relied on the
Public Trust Doctrine to justify the alienation of public trust lands for
purposes deemed to be in the best interest of the public227 and, in so do-
ing, noted that beachfront property available for public use had become
228scare in New Jersey. Yet, New Jersey, a state with over 123 miles of
coastline,229 is generally regarded as the first state to have judicially rec-
ognized the scope and applicability of the Public Trust Doctrine.230
Without question, all of New Jersey's coastline should comprise a sig-
nificant part of the lands held in trust for the public use,231 and for which
the trustee (the state legislature) is expressly prohibited from making any
"direct and absolute grant, divesting all the citizens of their common
right., 232 So then how did beachfront property available for public use
become so scarce in the state of New Jersey?
In answering this question, the court in Avon 233 begrudgingly admit-
ted that some prior conveyances may have constituted an improper al-
ienation of trust lands;234 that such improper alienation may be subject to
the right of public access to use the ocean waters;235 and that such public
222. See id.
223. See discussion infra pp. 200-201 and note 2.
224. See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. 1.
225. See Jaffe, supra note 202.
226. See New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 292 A.2d 545.
227. See id. at 560.
228. See id. at 579.
229. See Welby, supra note 76, at 70 n. 4.
230. See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 1.
231. See discussion infra pp. 200-201 and note 2.
232. See Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 1.
233. See Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d 47.
234. See id. at 54.
235. See id.
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access over privately held lands is problematic.236 However, as part of its
exploration of this difficult question, the court also dredged up long
submerged issues of even greater difficulty, namely the validity of pri-
vate title to public trust lands, and the public's right of access too current
trust lands and waters across former trust lands now in the possession of
private parties.237 Sadly, the court's willingness to bring this difficult is-
sue to the surface and expose it to the light of judicial scrutiny becomes
little more than a lament over past improper legislative action to alienate
trust lands.238 With no discussion whatsoever of the judiciary's repeated
acquiescence to or participation in such indiscretions, 239 and with appar-
ently little to offer in the way of a solution,2 40 the court hid behind the
judicial practice of determining that the case at hand does not require
resolution of such issues and declined to express an opinion.241 The is-
sues of the validity of private title to trust lands and public access over
that privately owned land, formerly owned by the trust and improperly
alienated by the state, are left to sink back into the dark and murky
depths.
Following some distance astern of Avon242 came Van Ness v. Bor-
ough of DeaL243 In Deal, the court continued to nourish the Doctrine by
holding that the fact that a municipality never dedicated its beach for
general use, in no way excluded the beach from being subject to the
Public Trust Doctrine.244 The court held that the public had the right to
use and enjoy the beach and that the municipality could not limit public
access rights "which, under the Doctrine, the public inherently has in
full. '245 However, the court also held that the Doctrine did not apply to
public access to a municipal beach club facility, access to which could be
regulated under the concept of municipal power as long as the limiting







242. See id. at 296.
243. 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978).
244. See id. at 573-74.
245. Id. at 574.
246. See id. at 572.
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In Deal, as in Avon,247 the court recognized that the validity of pri-
vate title to public trust lands was at issue.248 However, the court de-
scribed the issue as merely "troublesome, '249 and took shelter behind the
judicial practice of determining that this immensely important question
"is not involved in the present case and we leave a more definite resolu-
tion of it to specific facts and circumstances where it can be dealt with
directly., 250 Thus, even as the court continued to strengthen and expand
the applicability of the Doctrine to the remaining beachfront property
owned by the state and municipalities, it refused to address the applica-
bility of the Doctrine to public access over privately held trust land and
the validity of the titles to those lands.
Maintaining the course and speed established in Deal,251 the court in
Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst,252 declined the opportunity to apply the
Public Trust Doctrine to the issue of public access to municipal facili-
ties.253 Rather, the court decided the case under the concept of municipal
25power.  However, the court used the Doctrine to mandate equal public
access to public trust lands and dedicate upland beach area for public use
on a nondiscriminatory basis.255 In Hyland, the court expressly held that
"the general public is entitled to access to both the public trust lands
along the Allenhurst shoreline and to all portions of the dedicated beach
area ... for a fee no greater than that charged residents for similar
use."256 In addressing the issue of municipally owned facilities, the court
declined to expand the scope of the Doctrine and issued a crabbed inter-
pretation of the Doctrine's intent that found it to apply only to natural
resources and not to man-made structures.257 Further, the court held that
the Doctrine did not require municipalities to encourage use of public
trust lands but rather, it required the municipality to do nothing that inter-
247. See Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d 47.
248. See Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 574.
249. See id. at 574.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 175.
252. 372 A.2d 1133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
253. Seeid. at 1136.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 1135.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 1137.
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feres with public access to those lands.258 By so holding, the court again
endorsed the Doctrine's broad principle of insuring public accessibility
to trust lands but drew a line in the sand with regard to expanding the
applicability of the Doctrine beyond that point.259 The court did not ad-
dress the Doctrine's principle that trust land is inalienable.260 Nor did the
court address the corollary issues of public access over privately held
trust land and the validity of the private title to public trust lands.261
The inevitable conflict between private and public property rights
surfaced again in Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n.262 The
court decided the validity of a municipal zoning ordinance that prohib-
ited recreational use of privately-owned, unimproved oceanfront in a
community whose waterfront was exclusively zoned for single-family
residential use only.263 The private property owners were concerned that
their quiet residential neighborhood would be disrupted by large crowds
utilizing the beach.264 The court held that the zoning ordinance limiting
the use of the beach conflicted with the state's policy of encouraging and
protecting public access to, and recreational use of, the beachfront.265
However, in reaching this decision, the court held that the Public Trust
Doctrine was not directly implicated as the case concerned the exercise
of zoning power by a municipality.
2 66
The Lusardi court's position is unfathomable. The opinion is replete
with references to permit greater public access to oceans and beaches and
common ownership of the waterfront by the citizens of the state.2 67 Fur-
thermore, the court invalidated the ordinance because it conflicted with
the two statutes:268 the Beaches and Harbors Bond Act of 1977,269 a
statutory expression similar to the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Coastal
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See discussion supra pp. 200-201 and note 2.
261. See discussion infra pp. 215-217.
262. 430 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1981).
263. See id. at 883.
264. See id. at 884.
265. See id. at 887-88.
266. See id. at 886.
267. See id. at 884-87.
268. See id. at 887.
269. See id.
20001
NEW YORKLA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW
Area Facility Review Act,270 a regulation that gave priority to waterfront
development that served a greater rather than a lesser number of peo-
ple.271 By stating that the Public Trust Doctrine was not directly impli-
cated, which it clearly was, the court once again was able to skirt around
the issue of public access over privately held trust land. 72 Instead it ad-
dressed only quasi-public access to undeveloped waterfront property,
such access being consented to by the property owners.273 This suppos-
edly indirect implication of the Doctrine also allowed the court to ignore
the issue of the validity of private title to trust lands.274 To the contrary,
the court apparently had no problem with the ordinance that zoned the
entire waterfront of the municipality for private residential develop-
ment.
275
It was not until 160 years after Arnold276 effectively mapped out the
battle lines between the conflicting expectancy interests of private and
public property ownership by holding that "where the tide ebbs and
flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both water and
the land under the water.., are common to all people and that each has a
right to use them according to his pleasure...,,,277 that the New Jersey
court appeared ready to finally decide the issue of public access across
privately held trust lands. In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass'n,278 the New Jersey court handed down what has been proclaimed as
a landmark decision279 that increased public access to the beach. The
court held that under the Public Trust Doctrine, the public has the right to
both access and use of "privately-owned dry sand areas as reasonably
necessary" 280 for access to the foreshore and recreation on the dry





274. See discussion supra pp. 30-32.
275. See Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n., 430 A.2d 881, 883 (N.J.
1981).
276. See Arnold, at 6 N.J.L 1.
277. See supra note 197.
278. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
279. Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1915.
280. See Mathews, 471 A.2d at 365.
281. Seeidat366.
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that the public, and the Doctrine would finally receive their full entitle-
ment? Were advocates of public access to the beachfront, who for years
fought their battle against municipal and privately-held trust lands, fi-
nally victorious? Was this decision too good to be true? Well, as the
commonly held saying goes, "if something appears too good to be true,
that's because it probably is." The victory was a Pyrrhic one. In fact, it
may have been no victory at all.
The first problem with this transparent victory is that the court, in
announcing this new-found right of passage across "privately-owned dry
sand areas," 282 apparently had no problem with the conflict that exists in
characterizing inalienable trust lands as "privately-held., 283 It can be
surmised that either the court relied upon an unannounced holding af-
firmatively establishing the validity of title to privately-held trust lands,
or the court overlooked the fact that it had steadfastly charted a course
away from addressing that threshold issue.284
The second problem is that this new found right of passage is not as
sweeping as it appears to be on its surface. The right to pass is inexpli-
cably limited to crossing over "dry sand areas as reasonably neces-
sary. ''285 The court made no mention whatsoever about any right to cross
privately-held trust land that fronts on tidal waters where no dry sand
area exists (i.e., private properties with bulkheads and or piers that ex-
tend seaward of the mean high tide mark).286 Further, the reasonably nec-
essary standard established by Mathews2 87 is one that must be applied to
the facts of each case and portends somewhat consistent results at best
and at worst, no consistency at all.
Finally, no sooner did the court announce a sweeping right of public
access to, and use of, privately-owned trust land than it began to qualify
that right and ultimately withdraw it completely.288 The court first held
that "recognizing the increasing demand for our State's beaches and the
dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine, we find that the public must
be given both access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as rea-
282. Id. at 365.
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d 47.
285. See Mathews, 471 A.2d at 366.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 369.
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sonably necessary. 28 9 Then the court, in response to the Public Advo-
cate's urging that all privately-owned beachfront property be opened to
the public,290 held "nothing has been developed on this record to justify
that conclusion.",291 In a final pronouncement that takes the supposed
landmark decision2 92 and buries it beneath the sand, the court said "[a]ll
we decide here is that private land is not immune from a possible right of
access to the foreshore for swimming or bathing purposes, nor is it im-
mune from the possibility that some of the dry sand may be used by the
public incidental to the right of bathing and swimming., 293 In conclusion,
the court meekly added "[w]e realize that considerable uncertainty will
continue to surround the question of the public's right to cross private
land ... [w]here the parties are unable to agree ... the claim of the pri-
vate owner shall be honored until the contrary is established." 294
In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that far from granting to the
public the full measure of rights inherent under the Public Trust Doc-
trine,295 the court affirmatively reduced those rights.296 The court in
Matthews, by establishing a presumption in favor of the private owner of
supposedly inalienable trust lands, and by requiring that a public party
looking to assert its rights under the Doctrine must litigate to do so,29 7 did
indeed render a landmark decision. However, it is one upon which the
Public Trust Doctrine has run aground.
V. CONCLUSION
A. New York
It is as inaccurate to conclude that New York jurisprudence fully
recognizes the Public Trust Doctrine as it is to conclude that New York
289. Id. at 365
290. See id. at 369.
291. Id.
292. See Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1915.
293. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 369 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 370
295. See discussion infra pp. 189-192, 200-201.
296. See Mathews, 471 A.2d at 369.
297. See id.
[Vol. 44
PUBLIC ACCESS TO BEACHES
jurisprudence barely recognizes the Doctrine at all.298 The New York
court has not held a steady course in arriving at its current point of rec-
ognition of the Doctrine.299 The court's heading has varied considerably
from no recognition 00 to full recognition,30 1 and numerous positions in
between.3 °2 Perhaps the only familiar landmark discernable in the court's
foggy Public Trust Doctrine jurisprudence is a reluctance to recognize
and apply fully, the terminology and principles of the Doctrine.
30 3
While New York has recognized the first principle of the Doctrine,
namely, that public trust lands are subject to public rights of ingress and
egress, 304 the court has been unable to propose a workable solution to the
dilemma of public access across privately held waterfront property in
order to gain access to trust lands.305 Furthermore, the court's crabbed
interpretation of what constitutes waterfront trust land for purposes of
gaining such access is limited to land seaward of the high tide mark,
when the tide is low. 30 6 Apparently, the court recognizes no right to cross
privately held land when the tide is high.307
New York has also recognized the second principle of the Doctrine,
namely, that the form of such common ownership has been established as
a trust between the state and its citizens.30 8 However, such recognition
has failed to include holding the state government to the traditionally
high standard of duty that governs a trustee's conduct.30 9 To the contrary,
the court has defended the trustee's apparent breach of its fiduciary duty,
preferring instead to water down the trustee's responsibilities to the pub-
lic under the Doctrine.310 For the most part, the court has repeatedly
298. See, e.g., Gewirtz, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495;Gladsky, 563 N.Y.S.2d 842.
299. See, e.g., Gewirtz, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495; Gladsky, 563 N.Y.S.2d 842, Strong, 60
N.Y. 56; Smith, 118 N.Y. 634; Tiffany, 234 N.Y. 15.
300. See, e.g., Gewirtz, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495.
301. See, e.g., Gladsky,563 N.Y.S.2d 842.
302. See, e.g., Strong, 60 N.Y. 56;Tiffany, 136 N.E. 224; Dolphin Lane Assoc.,
339 N.Y.S.2d 966.
303. See, e.g., Strong, 60 N.Y. 56; Smith, 23 N.E. 1002; Tiffany, 136 N.E. 224;
Dolphin Lane Assoc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 966 ; Tucci, 329 N.Y.S. 2d 825.
304. See supra note 2.
305. See, e.g., Tiffany, 136 N.E. 224; Tucci, 329 N.Y.S. 2d 825.
306. See Id.
307. See Id.
308. See supra note 2.
309. See, e.g., Strong, 60 N.Y. 56; Dolphin Lane Assoc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 966.
310. See Id.
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given a wide berth to the issue of trustee breach of duty, and has at times
sailed right past the issue, even where the facts of a case make the issue
self-evident.31
It is with respect to the third principle of the Doctrine, namely, that
the state not dispose of public lands in a manner that substantially im-
pairs the interests of the public, 312 that the New York court has most con-
sistently failed to recognize and apply the Doctrine.313 In a state that has
proclaimed the Public Trust Doctrine as "well-settled common-law
... ,"314 the question that looms in front of the court like an enormous
iceberg is: If the state cannot dispose of public lands in a manner that
substantially impairs the interests of the public, then how did so much
waterfront trust land become alienated from the trust and conveyed into
private residential ownership? Despite the enormity of this issue, the
court has consistently failed to either perceive or acknowledge its pres-
ence.
3 15
It is not until 1991 that the court's decisional law evidences the rec-
ognition of the principle of inalienability of trust lands.316 But sadly for
the Public Trust Doctrine and the beach going public, the victory not
only comes late in the day, but it is shallow as well. The court's long
overdue recognition actually turned on a statutory embodiment of the
Doctrine, and was applied in a case where the land in question was in the
possession of a municipality, not private interests.317 The issue of the va-
lidity of past conveyances of trust land to private ownership in a manner
that substantially impaired the interests of the public, remains for now,
adrift.
311. Seeld.
312. See supra note 2.
313. See, e.g., Strong, 60 N.Y. 56, Smith, 23 N.E. 1002; Tiffany, 136 N.E. 224;
Dolphin Lane Assoc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 966 ; Tucci, 329 N.Y.S.2d 825.
314. See Gladsky, 563 N.Y.S.2d 842, 844.
315. See, e.g., Smith, 23 N.E. 1002; Tiffany, 136 N.E. 224; Dolphin Lane Assoc.,
339 N.Y.S.2d 966; Gewirtz, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495; Tucci, 329 N.Y.S.2d 825.
316. See Gladsky, 563 N.Y.S. 2d at 844.
317. See id.
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B. New Jersey
Despite its self-proclaimed role as savior of the Public Trust Doc-
trine,318 New Jersey's jurisprudence has neither fully recognized nor ap-
plied the Doctrine's principles.319 On the surface, New Jersey's deci-
sional law is so replete with the terminology of the Doctrine, that it ap-
pears that the New Jersey Court held a steady bearing and seldom lost
sight of the Doctrine's guiding principles.320 However, diving beneath
the court's facility with use of the Doctrine's terms, the decisional law
reveals a failure to stay the course and fully and consistently apply the
Doctrine's underlying principles.
New Jersey decisional law has recognized the first principle of the
Doctrine, namely, that public trust lands are subject to public rights of
ingress and egress. 32' However, the court has been unable to propose a
workable solution to the dilemma of public access across privately held
waterfront property in order to gain access to trust lands.322 More re-
cently, the court purported to pioneer an expansion of the definition of
beachfront trust property accessible by the public that promised to re-
solve this issue in favor of the public interests.323
However, on closer examination, the court's expansion of the public
right of access more resembled robbery on the high seas. Not only did
the court fail to expand the public right of access to privately held water-
front property,324 but in those instances where public and private interests
clash, the court has established a presumption in favor of private prop-
erty interests.
325
New Jersey has also recognized the second principle of the Doctrine,
namely, that the form of such common ownership has been established as
318. See New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545, 580
(N.J. 1972) (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
319. See, e.g., Hyland, 372 A.2d 1133;Lusardi, 430 A.2d 881.
320. See, e.g., Arnold, 6 N.J.L. 1; New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 292 A.2d
545; Borough ofNeptune City, 294 A.2d 47; Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 825
(N.J. 1978).
321. See sources cited supra note 2.
322. See, e.g., Van Ness, 393 A.2d 571); Hyland, 372 A.2d 1133; Lusardi, 430
A.2d 881.
323. See Matthews, 471 A.2d 355.
324. See id. at 369-70.
325. See id.
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a trust between the state and its citizens,326 but apparently only with re-
spect to such lands that are currently held in governmental possession. 7
The court has seemingly refused to acknowledge any failure on the part
of the state government in its role of trustee despite that as of 1977, 27%
of New Jersey's coastline was privately owned, and that private owner-
ship is expected to increase dramatically by the year 2000.1
28
With respect to the third principle of the Doctrine, namely, that the
state not dispose of public lands in a manner that substantially impairs
the interests of the public, 329 New Jersey early on recognized the princi-
ple of inalienability of trust lands, but again the courts have apparently
limited its application to only those beaches that have been traditionally
utilized by the public.330 The court has steadfastly refused to apply the
inalienability of trust land principle to what clearly were conveyances of
trust lands in a manner that substantially impaired the interests of the
public.33' The New Jersey Supreme Court has, as yet, been unable to
propose a solution to the dilemma of public access being limited to ever
decreasing public and quasi-public beaches as a result of continued pri-
vatization of the waterfront.332
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. Renewed Role For The Courts
Courts operate with an extraordinary degree of freedom.333 Their
view about the propriety of any issue that comes within their purview
significantly determines the procedural devices that will be employed to
address the issue at hand.334 Courts rarely rule that a policy is illegal be-
326. See sources cited supra, note 2.
327. See, e.g., New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 292 A.2d 545; Borough of
Neptune City, 294 A.2d 47; Matthews, 471 A.2d 355.
328. See Kehoe, supra note 11, at 1913.
329. See discussion infra pp. 15-16 and note 2.
330. See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 296, Lusardi, 430 A.2d at
881, Matthews, 471 A.2d at 355.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See Sax, supra note 1, at 558.
334. See id.
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cause it is unwise.335 Rather, courts generally choose to operate in a more
sophisticated and restrained realm whereby they can either require the
appropriate agency to provide additional justification for a questionable
policy or remand the policy for additional consideration by the legisla-
ture.336 In this manner, courts can either aid the underrepresented and
politically weak or place final authority over the matter into the hands of
the appropriate agency.
337
Governmental agencies that are responsible for performing their
function over a large, diverse geographic area, rather than within the con-
fines of a particular community, are rarely subject to attack by the public,
whom they supposedly serve.338 Any administrative process that calls for
public hearings on proposed agency action is, by and large, predeter-
mined and therefore, inadequately representative of the geographic area's
diffuse constituency. 339 This suggests that the proper role for the courts is
not to legislate from the bench, but rather to require other administrative
agencies or the legislature to make an express, public policy decision on
the matter in question.
340
The problem that the court faced in the public resource arena and in
applying the Public Trust Doctrine is that the diffuse majority (e.g., the
public) is frequently made subject to the will of a concentrated, self-
interested minority (e.g., private property owners).34' Often, such power-
ful minorities are able to have legislative and administrative bodies focus
on their self-interests to the exclusion of broad public interests.342 There-
fore, it is incumbent upon the courts, in matters pertaining to public trust
property and resource allocation, to promote and insure the equality of
political power between the disorganized and diffuse majority and the
organized and concentrated minority.343 The courts can best fulfill this
function by remanding appropriate public trust resource cases to the leg-





339. See Sax, supra note 1, at 558.
340. See id. at 559.






The courts could identify appropriate cases by keeping a lookout for
those situations in which a political imbalance exists.345 Political imbal-
ances are sure to be discovered whenever a claim is made on behalf of
diffuse public resource uses. 46 It is in such cases that diffuse public in-
terests will surely face difficulty in organizing and financing to effec-
tively deal with administrative and legislative agencies.347 There, the
courts should withdraw the usual presumption that the established ad-
ministrative or legislative process has adequately considered and re-
solved all of the relevant issues. 348 In effect, the courts must accept juris-
diction over the matter.349 The next step is to scrutinize each such case
for any indication that the issue has not been properly dealt with by the
administrative agency or legislature. 350 To aid in this most difficult part
of the process, courts have developed four guidelines:
351
1. Has title to public trust property been conveyed at less than fair
market value under circumstances where there is no very obvi-
ous reason for such a subsidy?
352
2. Has the government granted the authority to a private interest to
make public trust resource use decisions which may subordinate
broad public rights to private interests?
353
3. Has there been an attempt to reallocate public trust use rights to
private interests or to narrowly redefine public use rights?1
4
4. Is the resource in question being used for its natural purpose
(e.g., is the beachfront being used as a beach)?
355









354. See id. at 563.
355. See id. at 565.
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A court's steadfast application of these guidelines would allow it to
maintain a steady bearing and ensure: 1) that administrative and legisla-
tive decisions affecting public trust property would be subject to careful
scrutiny and require substantial supporting evidence;356 2) that claims
advocating private property rights to be superior to public trust use rights
would be denied unless they are consistent with a general public plan
regulating the resource in question; 357 3) that acts that infringe upon pub-
lic trust uses are presumed to have been made without adequate repre-
sentation of the diffuse public interest and, accordingly, must be sent
back for reaffirmation or more explicit justification; 358 and 4) that public
trust resources have their broadest benefits to the public when they are
left in their natural state.
359
The heading that a court should take with respect to application of
Public Trust Doctrine principles 360 to justify public access to trust prop-
erty, will depend on a number of factors.361 First, courts will be guided
by their views on whether, and to what degree, it is appropriate for the
judiciary to effect change generally considered the province of the legis-
lature.362 Second, the degree to which courts link the Public Trust Doc-
trine to the right of access to trust property3 63 will be strongly influenced
by the rapidly approaching crisis in the availability of beaches that are
open to the public.364 Third, the Doctrine will continue to evolve with the
needs of society.365 Finally, the degree to which state legislatures pass
legislation that codifies the principles of the Doctrine366 could potentially
have the greatest influence on the court.367 This potentially great influ-
356. See Sax, supra note 1, at 563.
357. See id. at 563.
358. See id.
359. See id. at 565.
360. See discussion infra pp. 15-16 and note 2.
361. See JACK H. ARCHER ET AL, THE PUBLIC TRUST DoCTRNE AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS, 99, 106 (1994).
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See David C. Slade, Putting The Public Trust Doctrine To Wor, National
Project On The Public Trust Doctrine, 337 (Nov. 1990).
365. See ARCHER, supra note 368, at 106.
366. See discussion infra pp. 15-16 and note 2.
367. See ARCHER, supra note 368, at 106.
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ence of legislative recognition of the Public Trust Doctrine is the topic
we will examine next.
B. A Renewed Role For The Legislature
Recognition of the Public Trust Doctrine by state courts alone will
not provide for full use of the Doctrine.368 In order to better coordinate
and balance the development and preservation of coastal resources, the
Doctrine must be salvaged from the depths of the common law and rec-
ognized by state statutory and regulatory law.
369
Before a state administrative agency can implement the Doctrine, it
must be lawfully authorized to do so. 370 Were the legislature to statutorily
recognize the Doctrine, each administrative agency with authority over
and responsibility for public trust resources would have to review its
mission and chart a new statutory and regulatory course.3 7'
It is imperative that any statutory recognition of the Doctrine also
expressly forbid the state from authorizing private use of trust property
where such use would unduly interfere with public trust rights.37 2 Addi-
tionally, no private use of public trust property should be unconditionally
irrevocable.373 Once made part of the statutory scheme, states could make
more effective use of the Doctrine by establishing a comprehensive area-
wide management plan.374
Once authorized by statute, a comprehensive area-wide management
plan would include management of the coastal zone and its resources,
including public trust resources.375 Traditionally, states have predomi-
nately managed coastal zone resources using their police powers.
376
However, the overlap of coastal zone resources and public trust resources
allows states opting for a comprehensive area-wide management plan to
anchor their management program in public trust principles377 and the




372. See Slade, supra note 371, at 249.
373. See id.
374. See Archer, supra note 368.
375. See id. at 100.
376. See id.
377. See discussion infra pp. 15-16 and note 2.
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states' police power.378 The advantages of such an approach are obvious:
from public trust principles 379 the state obtains legal support for priori-
tizing and prohibiting uses within the public trust/coastal zone and a de-
fense to claims of regulatory taking, while retaining the police power
defense for its management decisions.380 A comprehensive area-wide
plan would include prioritizing competing public trust uses, including
specifying certain uses as prohibited, and addressing the serious prob-
lems associated with the cumulative effects of unrelated coastal devel-
381opment projects.
The Public Trust Doctrine, because of its very nature as a trust, justi-
fies prioritizing and distinguishing between permissible and impermissi-
ble uses of trust lands,382 and with little risk of successful regulatory
takings claims.383 Once established, this prioritization can be recognized
by the legislature and codified in state law.384 Prioritizing competing
public trust uses, including prohibiting those uses considered impermis-
sible, would become part of a comprehensive area management plan.
385
The Doctrine has, at different times, permitted different use priorities.386
Where once the Doctrine recognized that navigation was a priority over
other uses of public trust lands, that is no longer the case.387 This inherent
flexibility of the Doctrine, at times the basis for claims of structural defi-
ciency,388 would permit states to alter the balance of uses at different
times based on changing social values.389
Finally, statutory incorporation of Public Trust Doctrine principles390
into a comprehensive area-wide plan would allow state trustees to estab-
lish limits on the cumulative effects of individual projects that affect trust
378. See ARCHER, supra note 368, at 100.
379. See discussion supra pp. 15-16 and note 2.




384. See id. at 99.





390. See ARCHER, supra note 368, at 102.
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resources and uses.391 The state trustee, acting on its obligation to pre-
serve trust property, could limit new trust uses which are harmful to trust
property or unduly infringe on established trust uses on the theory that
they harm the public interest.392 Similarly, states could decide to limit
development of waterfront property because it threatens the public inter-
est.393 Of even greater importance, states could limit individual uses or
projects not harmful in and of themselves because of their cumulative
effects on trust property and resources.394 The state trustee would be able
to justify this limitation on the ground that no trust use may be permitted
without adequate consideration of its effect on trust property and estab-
lished trust uses.395 Challenges by those parties affected by such limita-
tions based on a claim of regulatory taking would not prevail against a
properly applied and articulated Public Trust Doctrine.39
During the coming decade, the tide of people coming to the shore
promises to increase.397 This increase will only exacerbate the already
great strain on New York and New Jersey's access problems.398 Any
policy of providing greater access to the beachfront runs aground on the
fact that a substantial portion of the beachfront is in the hands of private
title holders.399 Many states, New York and New Jersey included, have
yet to utilize the Public Trust Doctrine on a widespread basis."' Notify-
ing landowners that they no longer have their traditional control and ex-
clusive title to the land that they own, land that may have been purchased
long ago and at great expense, is a titanic issue.40 1 Nevertheless, circum-
stances are becoming such that the issue will have to be dealt with. The
Public Trust Doctrine, in equilibrium with and/or incorporated as part of









397. See Summerlin, supra note 14, at 444.
398. See id.
399. See Welby, supra note 76, at 89.
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Whether invoked by the courts and/or the legislature, the Public
Trust Doctrine, because of its anchorage in ancient history, its epic jour-
ney of survival to modem times, and its most noble and majestic purpose
to protect and preserve the most sacred and invaluable of all natural re-
sources for the benefit of the common people, will have an indispensable
role to play in future resource controversies.
Frank Langella

